DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 – Respecting the Institutional Rules

For any arbitral institution, the registrar plays a critical role in ensuring a fair, economic and expeditious arbitral process.

In DMZ v DNA [2025] SGHC 31 (DMZ v DNA), the Singapore High Court (the Court) upheld the policy of minimal curial intervention in matters within the domain of arbitration, and refused to interfere with the registrar’s role in the arbitral process, when a party sought to challenge a registrar’s decision in arbitration proceedings.

Facts

In DMZ v DNA, the claimant sought permission of the Court (the Permission Proceeding) to commence proceedings (the Substantive Proceeding) against (i) the defendant; and (ii) the Registrar of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) (the Registrar), concerning the Registrar’s decision in relation to the date of commencement of particular SIAC-administered arbitrations.

In this regard, the SIAC initially confirmed to the parties that the arbitrations had commenced on 3 July 2024. The respondent in the arbitrations (the Claimant in these Singapore High Court proceedings) argued that the commencement date was more than 6 years after the alleged dispute (i.e., when the sums allegedly became due under the sale contracts between the parties), thereby time-barring the dispute. After hearing the request of the claimant in the arbitration (the Defendant in these proceedings) for amendment, the SIAC accepted the request and revised the commencement date to 24 June 2024, the date on which the Claimant filed the Notices of Arbitration.

Issues

The Court found that the Claimant’s application in the Permission Proceeding would turn on whether the Substantive Proceeding was “legally sustainable”. To determine the same, the Court addressed twoissues: (a) whether the Court had jurisdiction to review the Registrar’s decision; and (b) whether there was legal merit to the Substantive Proceeding?

The Court held that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the Registrar’s decision at this juncture.

The Court dismissed the Permission Proceeding, ruling that: (a) it had no jurisdiction to review the Registrar’s decision; and (b) in any event, there was no merit to the Substantive Proceeding.

On the first issue, the Court raised a preceding issue before it could address the Claimant’s arguments. The Court found that Substantive Proceeding was brought in breach of Rule 40.2 of the 2016 SIAC Rules (which states: “save in respect of Rule 16.1 and 28.1, the parties waive any right of appeal or review in respect of any decisions of…the Registrar”). The Court deemed Rules 16.1 and 28.1 as irrelevant on the facts. In coming to this conclusion, the Court took the view that the legal relationship between the relevant parties was a contractual one, and that the SIAC was therefore contractually obliged to comply with the SIAC Rules in administering the arbitrations. The parties to such arbitrations would also be contractually bound by the same, having expressly agreed to adopt SIAC arbitration (and its prevailing Rules) as their dispute resolution forum of choice.

The Court disagreed with the Claimant’s reference to Sun Travels & Tours v Hilton International Manage (Maldives) [2019] 1 SLR 372, and the Claimant’s argument that the Court has wide-ranging powers to grant declaratory relief in respect of a Singapore-seated arbitration. The Court held that the case upholds a policy of minimal curial intervention, and that the Court’s declaratory power is not unfettered. Additionally, the Court observed that the Substantive Proceeding was effectively a back-door appeal. The Court also recognised that the International Arbitration Act provides a basis for redress, i.e., through Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law. It made no difference that the arbitration proceedings would have to be completed first, as the Claimant incorrectly argued. Therefore, in failing to abide by the SIAC Rules, the Substantive Proceeding was an abuse of process.

On the second issue, the Claimant argued that the Registrar acted wrongfully in issuing the revision of the commencement date, because the Registrar breached Rule 40.1 of the SIAC Rules, which provides that the Registrar’s decisions are conclusive and binding.

The Court rejected the argument on four grounds. First, the Court disagreed with the Claimant’s interpretation that Rule 40.1 prohibits the Registrar from reviewing or reconsidering his own decisions (as compared to the decisions being binding upon the parties to the arbitration proceedings and the Tribunal). Secondly, the Court held that the Registrar’s decisions are administrative in nature, and such decisions can plainly be reconsidered. If a Tribunal is entitled to reconsider administrative decisions, an arbitral institution should be entitled to do the same. The principle of finality as raised by the Claimant was inapplicable upon the facts. Thirdly, allowing the Registrar to reconsider his own decisions would also be fair, expeditious and economical for parties as fortified by Rule 41.2. Lastly, the Court held that the SIAC Rules must be understood in the context of the IAA, which adopts specific language where it is intended for a particular decision not to be reviewed, corrected or amended.

Commentary

The decision in DMZ v DNA is an important decision as it clarifies that in Singapore, arbitral institutions are contractually obliged to comply with their own rules in administering arbitrations. In this regard, parties would need to be mindful that when they agree to a particular institution, the institution is also bound to follow the established applicable rules.

Additionally, parties should be aware that attempts to bypass the institution and approach the Courts for relief, despite a prior decision, would likely be classified as nothing better than a “back-door appeal” as recognised by the Court in DMZ v DNA. This is an important consideration for parties in evaluating the most cost-efficient method in which to challenge a registrar’s administrative decision. It is clear that mounting an early challenge before the Singapore Courts in relation to a decision of the SIAC Registrar is not appropriate at such an early juncture, and would only result in wasted costs.